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Facebook Fatalities: Students,
Social Networking, and the First
Amendment
Thomas Wheeler*
I.

Introduction

Phoebe Prince, a recent Irish immigrant, hanged
herself Jan. 14 after nearly three months of
routine torment by students at South Hadley
High School, via text message, and through the
social networking site, Facebook. . . .
Northwestern District Attorney Elizabeth
Scheibel said Prince‟s bullying was the result of a
romantic relationship she had with one of the
male suspects that ended weeks prior to her
suicide.1
District Attorney Scheibel stated “[t]he investigation
revealed relentless activity directed toward Phoebe, designed to
humiliate her and to make it impossible for her to remain at
school. . . . The bullying, for her, became intolerable.
Nevertheless, the actions—or inactions—of some adults at the
school are troublesome.”2 According to the district attorney,
“school administrators knew of the bullying but none would be
charged with criminal conduct.”3
This is not an isolated incident. Facebook celebrated its
* Mr. Wheeler is a member of the National School Boards Association
Board of Directors and Chairman of the Council of School Attorneys. He is a
partner with Frost Brown Todd LLC.
1. Russell Goldman, Teens Indicted After Allegedly Taunting Girl Who
Hanged
Herself,
ABC
NEWS,
Mar.
29,
2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/teens-charged-bullying-mass-girlkill/story?id=10231357.
2. Id. (internal citation omitted).
3. Id.
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sixth birthday on February 4, 2010 and announced at that time
that it had over 400 million members, making it the equivalent
of the world‟s third largest country, ahead of industrial
countries such as the United States (308 million), Russia (141
million), and Japan (127 million). Indeed, Facebook‟s
population only trailed China (1.34 billion) and India (1.2
billion).4 The rate of growth for Facebook has been exponential,
with approximately 700,000 new users a day and 21 million
new users per month.5 At this rate, Facebook will soon be
larger than any other country in the world.6
This explosive growth in social networking impacts all
segments of society, but given the youthful nature of many
Facebook users (54.3 percent of total users are ages eighteen to
twenty-four),7 the impact on students is dramatic and
occasionally tragic. Phoebe Prince was not the first teen suicide
victim of cyberbullying; there have been numerous other
documented instances and they seem to be on the rise.8
Because these attacks take place in the cyberworld, the
traditional pupil disciplinary framework is ill-suited to deal
with this behavior. As the South Hadley School Superintendent
noted in response to the suicide: “I think the principal did
everything he could. . . . Everyone expects the schools to solve
these problems, but we don‟t have magic-bullet solutions to
4. Pam Dyer, The Facebook Juggernaut: Exponential Growth + World‟s
Leading
News
Reader?,
PAMORAMA,
(Feb.
10,
2010),
http://www.pamorama.net/2010/02/10/the-facebook-juggernaut-exponentialgrowth-worlds-leading-news-reader/.
5. Id. (Just a year ago, Facebook had 150 million users and the increase
of 250 million users over that period represents the statistics given.).
6. Id.
7. Peter Corbett, Facebook Demographics And Statistics Report 2010 –
145%
Growth
In
1
Year,
ISTRATEGYLABS,
(Jan.
4,
2010),
http://www.istrategylabs.com/2010/01/facebook-demographics-and-statisticsreport-2010-145-growth-in-1-year/.
8. See, e.g., Steve Bird, Holly Grogan, 15, Leapt to her Death „After Abuse
from
Facebook
Bullies‟,
THE
TIMES,
September
21,
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6841908.ece; Oren Yaniv,
Long Island Teen‟s Suicide Linked to Cruel Cyberbullies, Formspring.me Site:
Police,
NEW
YORK
DAILY
NEWS,
March
25,
2010,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/03/25/2010-0325_li_teens_suicide_linked_to_cruel_cyberbullies_police.html
(“Alexis
Pilkington, 17, a West Islip soccer star, took her own life Sunday following
vicious taunts on social networking sites . . . .”).
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how kids behave.”9 Indeed, while the school administrators
were criticized in Prince, these same administrators are also
frequently the target of similar vicious cyber attacks. In one
recent case, a fourteen-year-old eighth grader at Blue
Mountain Middle School created a fictitious profile of her
principal that included his photograph from the school‟s
website, as well as profanity-laced statements that he was a
sex addict and pedophile.10 In another case, a student in
Pennsylvania created a website entitled “Teacher Sux.”11 The
website described the student‟s math teacher in obscene terms
and included pictures of the teacher‟s severed head dripping
blood, a picture of her face morphing into Hitler, and a
solicitation for funds to hire a hit man to kill her under the
caption “Why Should She Die?”12
On the eve of the anniversary of Phoebe Prince‟s tragic
death, the purpose of this Article is to look for clues to that
“magic-bullet” and to try and craft a workable legal framework
to assist students, parents, and school administrators in
navigating the complex legal waters that surround the
regulation of off-campus cyberspeech. Utilizing Supreme Court
precedent in traditional First Amendment student speech
cases, this Article examines the application of that traditional
framework to cases involving cyberbullying. The vehicle for
doing this will be to examine two recent Third Circuit cases
that involve very similar facts but resulted in dramatically
different outcomes: J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District,13 where the Court found that a school could discipline
a student for harassing off-campus speech on a social
networking site, and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
School District,14 which found that a school could not discipline
9. Peter Schworm, Schools Head Defends Response to Bullying, THE
BOSTON
GLOBE,
April
1,
2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/04/01/schools_
head_defends_response_to_bullying/?page=2.
10. J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-91
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, (Apr. 9, 2010).
11. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. No. 415, 807 A.2d 847,
850-51 (Pa. 2002).
12. Id. at 851.
13. 593 F.3d 286.
14. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
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a student for off-campus cyberspeech almost identical to that in
Snyder. Recognizing the obvious conflict between these two
panel decisions, the Third Circuit granted rehearing and the
two cases were reheard en banc on June 3, 2010.15 These cases
are likely heading to the Supreme Court, and this Article will
conclude with some suggestions regarding specific areas where
clarification from the Supreme Court could provide that “magic
bullet” to avoid further tragedies like the Phoebe Prince
suicide.
II. The Tinker/Bethel/Hazelwood Trilogy
Any examination of student free speech rights must
necessarily start with the seminal Supreme Court case of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.16
In Tinker, students wore black armbands to school in order to
protest the Vietnam War.17 The school banned the armbands
under its dress code and the students challenged the policy as
violative of their First Amendment rights.18 One of the key
factors in the challenge was the fact that, although the school
banned the black armbands under its dress code and
disciplined the students wearing that symbol, it did not ban
other potentially disruptive symbols such as a black cross that
could have evoked images of Nazi Germany.19
In overturning the ban, the Supreme Court found that
wearing black armbands was expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment and stated that “[i]t can hardly be
argued that . . . students . . . shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”20 It
determined that, absent the showing of a compelling interest,

15. Ruthann Robson, Third Circuit en banc Hears Oral Arguments About
Myspace.com, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG, (June 3, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/06/third-circuit-en-banc-hearsoral-arguments-about-myspacecom.html.
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. Id. at 504.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 510.
20. Id. at 506.
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the school could not ban the armbands.21 In doing so the Court
crafted a two-pronged test.22 Under this test, the court first
determines whether student speech is protected under the
First Amendment.23 In determining whether the speech is
protected, the court considers whether the student intended to
convey a particularized message and whether that message is
indeed the type of speech entitled to protection.24 It then
considers whether there is a reasonable likelihood that those
who viewed the speech would understand this message.25 If
both of these conditions are met then the speech is entitled to
constitutional protection and the court moves on to the second
inquiry: whether the school can demonstrate a sufficiently
compelling interest to permit it to restrict the protected speech,
i.e. a substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities.26 In Tinker, the Supreme Court found that the
armbands were intended to and did in fact convey a
particularized anti-Vietnam war message and thus constituted
speech protected by the First Amendment.27 The Supreme
Court then determined that the school failed to show that the
mere wearing of the armbands at school posed a serious threat
of material and substantial interference with the operation of
the school and therefore there was no compelling interest in
restricting the speech.28 The ban was overturned as a

21. See id.
22. Id. at 509.
23. Id.
24. Id. There are certain types of speech that are not protected
regardless of the circumstances. The classic example is the “fighting words”
doctrine most recently explored by the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (burning a cross is the symbolic equivalent of
fighting words as it is speech designed to elicit an immediate violent
response). However, more pertinent to this discussion are “true threats.”
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 512-13.
28. Id. Although it is true that students do not shed their constitutional
rights at the school house gate, id. at 506, it is also true that the
constitutional rights of students in public schools “„are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,‟ and must be „applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.‟” Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal citation omitted).
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consequence.29
Thus, the high water mark for student free speech rights,
not surprisingly, came from the Warren Court in the 1960s.30
Since that time, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed
student First Amendment rights more critically through the
prism of the unique needs of the Nation‟s public school system,
generally coming down on the side of the school.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,31 the issue was
slightly different. Although Fraser also involved on-campus
speech, the question presented was whether the school could
discipline a student for giving a nominating speech for a fellow
senior that referred to the candidate in terms of “an elaborate,
graphic and explicit sexual metaphor” in front of six hundred
students.32 The Supreme Court, while reaffirming the
continuing vitality of Tinker, nevertheless indicated that
student expressive rights at school were not co-extensive with
those of adults outside of school.33 The court refused to protect
student speech when it deemed that speech to intrude upon the
educational mission of the school.34 In so doing, the court made
it clear that vulgar, indecent, or disruptive speech can be
punished and prohibited in classrooms, assemblies, and other
school-sponsored educational activities, as such speech runs
counter to the educational objectives of schools.35 In a later case
the Supreme Court distilled two lessons from Fraser:

29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
30. In 1969, just a few months after Tinker was decided, the “Warren
Court” was no more. Chief Justice Earl Warren resigned at the conclusion of
the 1968-1969 term and was replaced by Nixon appointee Warren Burger.
Justice Fortas was replaced by another Nixon appointee, Harry Blackmun.
31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
32. Id. at 677-78.
33. Id. at 682.
34. Id. at 685.
35. Id. at 684-85 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse. Indeed, the „fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system‟ disfavor the use of terms of debate highly
offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is
truly the „work of the schools.‟”). Id. at 683 (internal citation omitted).
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For present purposes, it is enough to distill from
Fraser two basic principles. First, Fraser‟s
holding demonstrates that “the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.” Had Fraser delivered
the same speech in a public forum outside the
school context, it would have been protected. In
school, however, Fraser‟s First Amendment
rights were circumscribed “in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”
Second, Fraser established that the mode of
analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.
Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly
did not conduct the “substantial disruption”
analysis prescribed by Tinker.36
The final case in the trilogy is Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.37 Unlike Tinker and Bethel, where the issue was
whether the school had to tolerate certain types of student
speech, the question in Hazelwood was whether the school
could be forced to sponsor such speech.38 A student newspaper
sought to publish articles on sexual activities and birth control
but, upon review, the principal removed the articles because he
felt that the sexual references were inappropriate for younger
students and contained personally identifiable information.39
The students sued, alleging that the removal of the articles
violated their First Amendment rights.40 The Supreme Court
disagreed, distinguishing Tinker where “[t]he question whether
the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular
student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is
different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student

36. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007) (internal citation
omitted).
37. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
38. Id. at 270-71.
39. See id. at 262-64.
40. Id. at 264.
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speech.”41 The Supreme Court decided that it did not and
concluded:
[T]he standard articulated in Tinker for
determining when a school may punish student
expression need not also be the standard for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its
name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression. . . . Educators do not offend
the First Amendment . . . so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.42
These three seminal Supreme Court cases all involved
some form of on-campus speech. By comparison, the Phoebe
Prince case involved mostly off-campus cyberspeech. While the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, it did
brush up against it in Morse v. Frederick.43 That case was
widely viewed at the time as involving off-campus speech, and
school attorneys hoped that it would provide a glimpse into a
legal framework for addressing student cyberspeech.
In Morse, a student unfurled a banner with the words
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” across the street from the school after
being released to watch the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay as it
passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games
in Salt Lake City, Utah.44 The student was suspended for ten
days because the principal believed that the banner encouraged
illegal drug use in violation of established school policy.45
The student challenged the ban, arguing that the speech
on his banner was protected under the First Amendment and
that the school had no right to restrict his off-campus speech.46
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts did not find the
case particularly difficult. He viewed the student‟s actions,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 272-73.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 399.
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despite taking place across the street from the school, as oncampus speech, writing:
At the outset, we reject Frederick‟s argument
that this is not a school speech case—as has
every other authority to address the question.
The event occurred during normal school hours.
It was sanctioned by Principal Morse “as an
approved social event or class trip,” and the
school district‟s rules expressly provide that
pupils in “approved social events and class trips
are subject to district rules for student
conduct.”47
Given the possible “pro-drug interpretation of the
banner”48 and the fact that the banner was unfurled at a school
sponsored event, Chief Justice Roberts felt that the case fell
squarely within the parameters of Fraser‟s educational mission
criteria: “The question thus becomes whether a principal may,
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as
promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.”49
This decision notwithstanding, citing Porter v. Ascension
Parish School Board,50 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged
that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to
when courts should apply school speech precedents, but not on
these facts.”51 Porter involved a fourteen year old student who
sketched a picture of a siege on his school by various armed
persons.52 The sketch also contained obscenities and racial
epithets directed at fellow students.53 He did the sketch at
home and stored it in a closet.54 Two years later, his younger

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 400-01 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (citing Porter, 393 F.3d at 615 n.22).
Porter, 393 F.3d at 611.
Id.
Id.
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brother used the same sketch pad and took it to school.55
Students showed the siege sketch to administrators stating
that “Miss Diane, look, they‟re going to blow up EAHS.”56
Administrators called the student, then sixteen years old, down
to the office where he was searched.57 During the search they
“found a box cutter with a one-half inch exposed blade in his
wallet. The officials also found notebooks in Adam‟s bag
containing references to death, drugs, sex, depictions of gang
symbols, and a fake ID.”58 The Fifth Circuit held that the
school could not discipline the student for the sketch even
though it ended up on campus:
Given the unique facts of the present case, we
decline to find that Adam‟s drawing constitutes
student speech on the school premises. Adam‟s
drawing was completed in his home, stored for
two years, and never intended by him to be
brought to campus. He took no action that would
increase the chances that his drawing would find
its way to school; he simply stored it in a closet
where it remained until, by chance, it was
unwittingly taken to Galvez Middle School by his
brother. This is not exactly speech on campus or
even speech directed at the campus.59
These cases frame any debate over student cyberspeech
with the issue appearing to turn on, as noted in Morse, whether
the speech occurs at school.60 Unfortunately, this begs the
question in the cyberspeech arena. What does “at school”
mean? Porter seems to hold that just because the speech
inadvertently comes on to school grounds, this does not mean it
is student speech at school. In the case of cyberbullying
directed at a student like Phoebe Prince, is a text sent to her
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 611-12.
58. Id. at 612.
59. Id. at 615.
60. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007) (discussing whether
student speech is protected while at a school event).
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phone which she views at school student speech “at school”?
What if she accessed her Facebook account on a school
computer only to find a hateful message? Is that student
speech “at school”? Is it enough that a student simply throws
the speech out into cyberspace from home without regard to
where and how it might be accessed, and when it is accessed at
school, does it then become student speech “at school”? Given
this unsettled legal framework, is it any surprise that the
administrators in the Phoebe Prince case may have been slow
to act in disciplining the alleged cyberbullies for their texts and
Facebook postings?
III.

Regulating Off-Campus Speech: Underground
Newspapers61

Perhaps the closest historical analogy to web-based
student Internet speech can be found in the off-campus
newspaper cases which have been litigated since the mid1960s. Notwithstanding Porter, a majority of these cases
permit schools to regulate off-campus student speech when it is
directed at school and comes on to school grounds or causes a
disruption at school. Thus, in Sullivan v. Houston Independent
School District,62 a student was punished for an underground
newspaper distributed off-campus, but at the entrance to the
school which was then brought onto school grounds.63 The
student sued the school claiming that the punishment violated
his First Amendment rights.64 The Fifth Circuit found that the
student flagrantly disregarded established school regulations,
never having attempted to comply with a prior submission rule
which was the product of an extensive and good-faith effort to
formulate a valid student conduct code. Indeed, the court noted
that the student had openly and repeatedly defied the
principal‟s request to submit the paper for review and instead
61. Portions of these materials have been previously published in
Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons from the Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of
Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215
EDUC. L. REP. 227 (2007).
62. 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 1074.
64. Id. at 1072.
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resorted to profane epithets.65 A key factor in this case was the
finding that the papers were “distributed . . . off campus in a
manner calculated to result in their presence on the campus.”66
As a consequence, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
disruption, the Fifth Circuit denied the student‟s request for
relief, noting that “[t]oday we merely recognize the right of
school authorities to punish students for the flagrant disregard
of established school regulations; we ask only that the student
seeking equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional actions
by school officials come into court with clean hands.”67
In Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School,68
several students distributed an unofficial newspaper, Tour de
Farce, which they had written off of school grounds but
distributed on campus.69 Based on the content of some of the
articles that encouraged vandalism at the school, the principal
suspended some of the authors.70 In dismissing the First
Amendment challenge the Minnesota district court found that
there was a substantial likelihood of material disruption
surrounding the distribution of the papers satisfying the
second prong of Tinker, that “Tour de Farce contains language
that is more sexually explicit, indecent, and lewd than Fraser‟s
strictly metaphorical speech,” and that it advocated violence
against the teachers.71 Consequently, the discipline was
65. Id. at 1075-76.
66. Id. at 1073.
67. Id. at 1077.
68. 686 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987).
69. Id. at 1389.
70. Id. at 1390.
71. Id. at 1393. See also Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., where
students used obscene and vulgar language in an underground newspaper
published off-campus and distributed to students just outside the main
campus gate. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The school suspended them
for ten (10) days and the students challenged the suspension under the First
Amendment. Id. Although pre-Fraser, the court used the same profane/vulgar
analysis to find that the school had the authority to punish the students for
these newspapers that found their way on to campus. Id. In Pangle v. BendLapine Sch. Dist., a student wrote and distributed a newsletter on school
grounds that included a list of acts that he “would like to see happen at
school . . . to the people who „run‟ it.” 10 P.3d 275, 277 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
The list described, in part, “feed[ing] snake bite antidote or Visine to
someone, as well as [b]lowing things up and bomb threats.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). He was disciplined for the newsletter and challenged that

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/5
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upheld.
In contrast with these two cases is Thomas v. Board of
Education of Granville Central School District.72 In that case,
several students modeled an off-campus newspaper on
National Lampoon and included articles on “masturbation and
prostitution,” among other things.73 A teacher assisted in the
efforts and advised the assistant principal of the general
nature of the project but not the specifics.74 The students were
directed by the assistant principal not to offend or hurt others
and to keep it off campus.75 However, “the publication was
stored, with [the teacher‟s] permission, in his classroom closet.
At the end of each school day, the students retrieved a number
of copies and sold each one for twenty-five cents to classmates
at Stewart‟s, a store in Granville.”76 Copies eventually made it
onto campus and came to the attention of the school
administration when a teacher confiscated a copy from a
student.77 Noting that “all but an insignificant amount of
relevant activity in this case was deliberately designed to take
place beyond the schoolhouse gate,” the Second Circuit found
no nexus with the school and thus no basis for disciplining the
students.78
The most recent off-campus newspaper case involved a
high school student who was expelled after his article about
how to “hack” into the school‟s computers was published in an
underground newspaper.79 In Boucher v. School Board of the
School District of Greenfield, students published an

discipline, in part, under the First Amendment. Id. at 277-78. The Oregon
Court of Appeals treated this as school speech and applied the Fraser
analysis rejecting the student‟s argument that “the use of vulgar or
threatening language not resulting in actual disruption is not subject to
discipline.” Id. at 286.
72. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 1045.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1050.
79. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 821
(7th Cir. 1998).
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underground newspaper off campus entitled The Last.80 “The
inaugural issue . . . provocatively explained that The Last was
intended to „ruffle a few feathers and jump-start some to
action.‟”81 The June issue of The Last was distributed in
bathrooms, lockers, and the cafeteria at Greenfield High School
and contained an article, entitled So You Want To Be A Hacker,
that purported to “tell everyone how to hack the school[„]s gay
ass computers.”82
Upon investigation the school determined that the author
of the article was Mr. Boucher and suspended him pending
expulsion for “endanger[ing] school property.”83 Boucher
challenged the discipline, contending that it violated his First
Amendment rights.84 Using the first prong of Tinker, the school
argued that the article was not protected speech under the
First Amendment because it disclosed restricted access codes in
violation of Wisconsin‟s computer crimes law.85 The Seventh
Circuit focused instead on the second factor in the Tinker test,
whether the speech was disruptive. Boucher argued that
because the newspaper was circulated, the school had to show
“actual” harm to the school in order to punish him.86 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument: “The Court has
indicated that in the case of student expression, the relevant
test is whether school authorities „have reason to believe‟ that
the expression will be disruptive.”87 The Seventh Circuit went
on to note that:
[T]he article “does encourage activity which could
be invasive and destructive to the School‟s
computer system and the information on it.” It is
largely irrelevant that the article may not have
actually (and in hindsight) provided as valuable
advice as purported or that the information
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 827.
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disclosed may not have been as secret as
represented; on the facts before us a reader
might reasonably take the article at face value.88
Boucher also argued that he should not be punished
because he wrote the article off school grounds.89 The Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it noted
that “the article was in fact distributed on campus” and thus it
did not matter where it was actually written.90 Second, the
court noted that “the article advocates on-campus activity”
which gave a sufficient nexus to the school to permit it to
regulate the speech.91
IV.

Cyberharassment in the Courts

It is interesting to note that since the advent of the
Internet, the vast majority of cyberspeech cases involve not
student/student harassment as in the Phoebe Prince case, but
instead involve student/administrator harassment. This may
be because most of this activity is directed at school
administrators, or perhaps simply that administrators are
more likely to act when their own ox is gored.
In reviewing the propriety of the student‟s suspension the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
However, while the freedom of speech is
rightfully cherished, it is also clear that this
right of free speech “is not absolute at all times
and under all circumstances.” For example,
certain types of speech can be regulated if they
are likely to inflict unacceptable harm. These
narrow categories of unprotected speech include
“fighting words,” speech that incites others to
imminent lawless action, obscenity, certain types

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 828.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
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of defamatory speech, and “true threats.”92
The first prong of the Tinker test seems to adapt well to
the Internet context as it simply looks to the message being
communicated and analyzes whether it is protected speech.93
This analysis really does not vary with the mode of the speech.
Whether a student writes “I am against the Vietnam War,”
shouts it as a slogan at a protest, wears it on her arm, or posts
it on a website, the message remains the same. For First
Amendment purposes much student cyberspeech would be
protected as long as it is not disruptive and does not fall into
one of several categories, such as “true threats,” that the
Supreme Court has recognized as being unprotected.
In J.S. ex rel. H.S., the school argued that the student‟s
website was not protected speech as it constituted a “true
threat” in that it contained the teacher‟s severed head and a
solicitation for funds to hire a hit man.94 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the
website did not constitute a “true threat” because it was not
sent to the teacher and indeed was designed specifically to
preclude access by teachers and administrators.95 As a
consequence the court noted, “we conclude that the statements
made by J.S. did not constitute a true threat, in light of the
totality of the circumstances present here. We believe that the
web site, taken as a whole, was a sophomoric, crude, highly
offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or
parody.”96 As will be discussed later in this article, J.S. ex rel
H.S. notwithstanding, most courts have found such comments
to constitute true threats. Under Tinker, if the statement is a
true threat then it is not protected free speech, regardless of
whether it is uttered in school, in a poem at home, or in
cyberspace.97
Since the J.S. ex rel. H.S. court found that the speech was
92.
93.
(1969).
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 854 (internal citation omitted).
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 856-57.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 856.
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not a “true threat,” it determined that the cyberspeech was
protected by the First Amendment under the first prong of
Tinker.98 However, under the second prong of Tinker, a school
may still restrict student speech if it can show that the speech
is likely to create a substantial or material disruption at
school.99 The primary factor in this analysis whether there is a
nexus between the cyberspeech and a potential impact at
school. “A school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its „basic educational mission,‟ even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school.”100
In J.S. ex rel. H.S. the court squarely addressed the oncampus/off-campus distinction that the Morse court
sidestepped and resolved the issue in the school‟s favor:
We find there is a sufficient nexus between the
web site and the school campus to consider the
speech as occurring on-campus. While there is no
dispute that the web site was created off-campus,
the record clearly reflects that the off-campus
website was accessed by J.S. at school and was
shown to a fellow student. . . . Importantly, the
web site was aimed not at a random audience,
but at the specific audience of students and
others connected with this particular School
District; Mrs. Fulmer and Mr. Kartsotis were the
subjects of the site. Thus, it was inevitable that
the contents of the web site would pass from
students to teachers, inspiring the circulation of
the web page on school property. We hold that
where speech that is aimed at a specific school
and/or its personnel is brought onto school
campus or accessed at school by its originator,
the speech will be considered on-campus

98. Id. at 860.
99. Id. at 861-62.
100. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)
(citation omitted).
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speech.101
The court further noted that:
While the fact that J.S. personally accessed his
website on school grounds is a strong factor in
our assessment, we do not discount that one who
posts school-targeted material in a manner
known to be freely accessible from school grounds
may run the risk of being deemed to have
engaged in on-campus speech, where actual
accessing by others in fact occurs, depending
upon the totality of the circumstances
involved.102
The J.S. ex rel. H.S. approach has the benefit of creating a
bright-line test for administrators and students. If the website
is accessed by students at school then the speech will be
deemed to have taken place on-campus and the school may
regulate it. The danger this presents for students,
acknowledged in footnote 12 of the opinion, is that once a
website is created and placed on the Internet the creator
cannot control who accesses it and where they do so. Thus,
even if the creator did not intend the website to be accessed at
school and even if she actually takes steps to prevent it, if
someone does access it at school, then the student is at risk.
Given the nature of the unrestricted speech and the potential
for harm, this seems to be a reasonable balance of the
respective interests.
Once a nexus with the school has been established, the
second prong of Tinker requires that, prior to regulation, a
school must demonstrate actual or potential disruption to the
educational process posed by the speech.103 This is based on a
recognition that a school has a “compelling interest in having
an undisrupted school session conducive to the students‟
101. J.S. ex rel H.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
102. Id. at 865 n.12.
103. Id. at 861 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
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learning.”104 Thus, a school may regulate student speech if
“facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities” are present.105 Moreover, Tinker does not
require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs
before they may act. “„In fact, they have a duty to prevent the
occurrence of disturbances.‟ Forecasting disruption is
unmistakably difficult to do. Tinker does not require certainty
that disruption will occur, „but rather the existence of facts
which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast
substantial disruption.‟”106
Subsequent litigation over student websites gives some
guidance as to the degree of disruption that must be
demonstrated prior to regulation. At one end of the spectrum
are cases like Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
School District,107 which involved a relatively mild off-campus
website that contained unflattering comments about the
school‟s principal. Using Tinker, the court found that the
speech was protected and that the school could not
demonstrate any disruption due to the website, thus
overturning the suspension on First Amendment grounds.108
104. Grayned v. City of Rockland, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972).
105. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
106. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal citation omitted).
107. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
108. Id. See also Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F.Supp.2d
698 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Student made several postings, including one from
school, that could fairly be characterized as a routine trash-talking about
another school‟s volleyball team and players. Id. at 700-01. The court made
short work of this case but used a different type of analysis. Rather than
looking at disruption and related Tinker issues, the court overturned the
discipline on overbreadth grounds noting that the discipline policy itself was
overbroad as it did not “geographically limit a school official‟s authority to
discipline expressions that occur on school premises or at school related
activities, thus providing unrestricted power to school officials.” Id. at 705.
See also Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of the North Canton City Sch., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Middle school student created a website for
his skateboarding group that was maintained on his home computer. Id. at
795. The website was not obscene per se but had some insulting sentences
about several fellow students and was accessed at school. Id. The district
discovered the website and suspended the student for the comments about
fellow students. Id. at 796. The court refused to grant the school summary
judgment on the student‟s First Amendment claims finding that it was not
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Toward the middle of the spectrum is the case of Mahaffey
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich,109 in which the student created a
website “for laughs,” because he was bored and “wanted
something to do.” The website was entitled “Satan‟s web page”
and contained statements such as:
SATAN‟S MISSION FOR YOU THIS WEEK:
Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire
throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and
with their last breath, just before everything
goes black, spit on their face. Killing people is
wrong don‟t do It. unless Im there to watch. __
Or just go to Detroit. Hell is right in the middle.
Drop by and say hi.
PS: NOW THAT YOU‟VE READ MY WEB PAGE
PLEASE DON‟T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND

inappropriate for a student to visit his own website which was not clearly
obscene. Id. at 801. See also Killion v. Franklin Reg‟l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp.
2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Student compiled a “Top Ten” list about the athletic
director referring to him as fat, impugning his masculinity, and deriding the
size of his genitals. Id. at 448. The top ten list was sent off-campus in an email but copies were later found in the teachers‟ lounge and elsewhere
around school. Id. 448-49. Notwithstanding the fact that the e-mail did make
its way onto school grounds, the court sided with the student: “Given the out
of school creation of the list, absent evidence that [the student] was
responsible for bringing the list on school grounds, and absent disruption, . . .
[the school] could not, without violating the First Amendment, suspend [the
student] for the mere creation of the . . . Top Ten list.” Id. at 458. See also
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
Student created a website on his home computer entitled the “Unofficial
Kentlake High Home Page.” Id. at 1089. The website was highly critical of
the school‟s administration and had two mock obituaries with visitors
encouraged to vote for the next one to “die.” Id. The local media discovered
the site and characterized it as a Columbine type “hit list.” Id. The student
was suspended and sued the school alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights. Id. The school lost as the district court found that the
speech took place entirely off of school grounds and the school was unable to
demonstrate any specific evidence of disruption caused by the site nor that it
was a true threat and thus unprotected: “The defendant, however, has
presented no evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this web site
were intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or
manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.” Id. at 1090.
109. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
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STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK? 110
Despite the offensive nature of the speech, the only nexus
with the school with respect to the creation of the site was a
statement by the student that some of the website creation
“may have” taken place on school computers.111 The school also
could not demonstrate any actual or potential disruption.112 As
a consequence, “Defendants‟ regulation of Plaintiff‟s speech on
the website without any proof of disruption to the school or on
campus activity in the creation of the website was a violation of
Plaintiff‟s First Amendment rights.” 113
At the far end of the spectrum permitting discipline are
cases like J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District.114
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
comments on the website did not constitute a “true threat” and
therefore were protected speech,115 the court upheld the
student‟s expulsion nevertheless because the school
successfully demonstrated that the website had the potential
for and did in fact create a substantial disruption at school.116
This determination was based primarily on the fact that, after
viewing the website, the math teacher singled out on the site
missed the rest of the year due to anxiety and fear.117
The web site posted by J.S. in this case disrupted
the entire school community—teachers, students
and parents. The most significant disruption
caused by the positing of the web site to the
school environment was direct and indirect
impact of the emotional and physical injuries to
Mrs. Fulmer. . . . Mrs. Fulmer was unable to
complete the school year and took a medical
leave of absence for the next year. Mrs. Fulmer‟s
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 782.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
807 A.2d 847 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
Id. at 867.
Id. at 869.
Id.
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absence for over twenty days at the end of the
school year necessitated the use of three
substitute
teachers
that
unquestionably
disrupted the delivery of instruction to students
and
adversely
impacted
the
education
environment.118
Taking these cases together, they seem to create a useful
basic framework for analyzing Internet-based student free
speech claims. Applying the Tinker analysis, assuming some
form of nexus with the campus, a school may regulate
electronic speech if “facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities” are present.119 The
categories most likely to apply to student Internet speech are
usually “obscenity, certain types of defamatory speech, and
true threats.”120 Of these, in this post-Columbine world, the
most significant area of concern would be threats.
However, some writers have suggested that this type of
framework goes too far in permitting schools to punish
students for cyberspeech, particularly in the student/student
harassment cases. For example, one writer notes that
“[p]resently, there is a risk that students‟ First Amendment
rights will be infringed because courts are placing too much
emphasis on the Columbine tragedy without considering the
well-known adage, „kids will be kids.‟”121 The problem, of
course, is that while kids will be kids, schools are required to
attempt to mold them into adults, and in doing so, federal law
requires schools to respond to and remedy inappropriate
harassing behavior. For example, the Supreme Court in Davis
ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education122
held that, under Title IX, schools that are aware of peer sexual
118. Id.
119. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
120. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 854 (internal citation omitted).
121. Sandy S. Li, The Need for a New Uniform Standard: The Continued
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 66-67
(2005).
122. 526 U.S. 629, 646-47 (1999).
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harassment and fail to adequately respond to it will be liable
for that harassment. Similarly, the United States Department
of Education‟s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) considers peer
hostile environment racial harassment to be a violation of Title
VI.123 In an October 26, 2010 “Dear Colleague” letter, OCR took
the position that, under Title IX, schools are required to
regulate harassing cyberspeech regardless of whether it comes
on to school grounds or not.124 Other courts have also
recognized a cause of action for disability-based harassment as
well.125 In addition to these federal laws, as noted in a recent
report by the Education Commission of the States, many states
have adopted statutes requiring schools to develop effective
anti-bullying policies.126
The other problem is that while “kids will [indeed] be
kids,” it leads to precisely the type of harassment that led to
the Phoebe Prince suicide.127
V. The Third Circuit Layshock/J.S. ex rel. H.S. Disconnect
Just as it would seem from the preceding section that the
courts are approaching some type of consensus regarding the
regulation of student cyberspeech, on February 4, 2010, the
Third Circuit handed down two decisions in cases with almost
identical facts but which had dramatically different results.

123. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational
Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (Mar. 10,
1994). See Bryant v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2003);
Williams v. Port Huron Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-14556, 2010 WL
1286306 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010).
124. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec‟y for Civil Rights, Dep‟t of
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Education Colleagues (Oct. 26, 2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201010.pdf.
125. K.M. ex rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
126. See Jennifer Dounay, State Anti-bullying Statutes, EDUCATION
COMMISSION
OF
THE
STATES
(April
2005),
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/41/6041.doc.
127. Li, supra note 125, at 67.
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A. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School
District,128 Justin Layshock, a senior at Hickory High School,
created a fake profile of his principal, Eric Trosch, on
MySpace.com, using his grandmother‟s off-campus computer
during non-school hours.129 Although no school resources were
used to create the profile, Layshock copied, without permission,
a photograph of Mr. Trosch from the school‟s website and used
it in the profile.130 In addition to the usual juvenile sexual
comments, the parody stated that the principal was a drunk
and contained comments that he had stolen a “big keg,” that he
was “too drunk to remember” the date of his birthday, and that
he smoked marijuana and used other drugs.131 Principal Trosch
testified that he “believed all of the profiles were „degrading,‟
„demeaning,‟ „demoralizing,‟ and „shocking.‟”132
Layshock told a few friends about the profile but
eventually “word of the profile „spread like wildfire‟ and soon
reached most, if not all, of Hickory High‟s student body.”133
Following Layshock‟s initial profile “three other students also
posted unflattering profiles of Trosch on MySpace. Each of
those profiles was more vulgar and more offensive than
Justin‟s. . . . On December 15, Justin used a computer in his
Spanish classroom to access his MySpace profile of Trosch. He
also showed it to other classmates . . . .”134
Principal Trosch discovered the profiles but was initially
unable to block student access because “the Technology
Coordinator[] was on vacation . . . . Instead, student use of
computers was limited to labs or the library where it could be
supervised.”135 Computer access was limited for more than a

128. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated
by No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
129. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 253.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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week “and computer programming classes were cancelled.”136
School administrators eventually learned that Layshock was
behind the profile and he was given a “ten-day, out-of-school
suspension,” banned from extra-curricular activities, placed in
the alternative education program, and was not allowed to
attend graduation ceremonies.137
Layshock and his parents sued the school, arguing that the
punishment violated his First Amendment rights and their
Fourteenth Amendment rights.138 The district court granted
Layshock summary judgment on his First Amendment claim,
finding that the school had violated his rights, and granted the
school summary judgment on the parents‟ Fourteenth
Amendment claims.139 The parties cross-appealed the
decisions.140
The Third Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the
Tinker/Bethel/Hazelwood trilogy and stating that, under this
framework, “it is important to note that the district court found
that the District could not „establish[] a sufficient nexus
between Justin‟s speech and a substantial disruption of the
school environment[,]‟ and the School District[] does not
challenge that finding on appeal.”141 Instead, the school focused
its argument on appeal on the Fraser/Morse lewd and vulgar
standard because it believed the case was an on-campus speech
case.142 In support of this, the school noted that the speech
started on school grounds when Layshock “stole” the picture of
Principal Trosch and ended on school grounds when Layshock
accessed the site in Spanish class and showed it to his
friends.143 The school argued that, because the profile was oncampus speech that was lewd and vulgar and ran contrary to
the school‟s basic educational mission, under Fraser/Morse the
school could regulate the speech.144
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
Id. at 261.
See id. at 259.
Id.
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The Third Circuit panel decision seems to have
misunderstood this argument and confused the Fraser/Morse
analysis with the Tinker substantial disruption standard. As
discussed earlier, under Fraser/Morse a school may regulate
lewd or vulgar on-campus speech regardless of disruption: “The
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would
undermine the school‟s basic educational mission.”145
Nevertheless, the Layshock panel seems to have rested its
decision on the fact that the school could not show substantial
disruption:
Moreover, when pressed at oral argument,
counsel for the School District conceded that the
District was relying solely on the fact that Justin
created the profile of Trosch. We have found no
authority that would support punishment for
creating such a profile unless it results in
foreseeable and substantial disruption of
school.146
This statement is simply incorrect and
Fraser/Morse framework as well as Tinker itself.

ignores

the

145. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
146. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263. This concession is
troubling, since it appears that there was indeed significant disruption as a
consequence of the profile. As the district court noted: “However, Defendants
presented considerable evidence that Plaintiff‟s website caused actual
disruption of the day-to-day operation of Hickory High School from December
12 through December 21, 2005. Justin‟s parody of [the principal], as well as
the other parodies of unknown origin, were accessed incessantly by students
at Hickory High School, which in turn caused the school to shut down its
computer system to student use from December 16 through December 21,
2005. The lack of access to the computer system caused the cancellation of
several classes and interfered with students‟ ability to use the computers for
their school-intended purposes. During this period of time Frank Gingras, the
school district‟s technology coordinator, was required to devote approximately
25% of his time to dealing with the disruption caused by the profiles at
www.myspace.com. This time was consumed by attempts to block the
numerous addresses from which students were attempting to access the
profiles on school computers, as well as efforts to install additional firewall
protections on the school‟s computer system.” Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
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To the extent that the panel in Layshock even considered
the Fraser/Morse framework, it seems to ignore the fact that
Layshock himself admitted accessing the website at school and
showing it to several friends. This despite the fact that the
panel opinion itself notes that “[o]n December 15, Justin used a
computer in his Spanish classroom to access his MySpace
profile of Trosch. He also showed it to other classmates . . . .”147
It is difficult to understand, given this statement, how the
panel could then conclude that “[t]here is no evidence that
Justin engaged in any lewd or profane speech while in
school.”148 In fact this statement seems to run contrary to the
caption of one section of the panel opinion: “The District can
not Punish Justin Merely because his Speech Reached inside
the School.”149 It seems as if the panel assumed that accessing
a website Layshock himself created and showing it to other
students is not “speech.” If so, this position makes no sense
given the Supreme Court‟s broad view of speech, written,
spoken, and expressive.
This flawed assumption appears to underlie the panel‟s
decision to treat this case as an off-campus speech case which
drove its resolution of the matter: “[T]he District is not
empowered to punish his out of school expressive conduct
under the circumstances here.”150
It would be an unseemly and dangerous
precedent to allow the state in the guise of school
authorities to reach into a child‟s home and
control his/her actions there to the same extent
that they can control that child when he/she
participates in school sponsored activities.
Allowing the District to punish Justin for
conduct he engaged in using his grandmother‟s
computer while at his grandmother‟s house

147. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253.
148. Id. at 260 (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599-600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)).
149. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260.
150. Id. at 263.

27

2011]

FACEBOOK FATALITIES

209

would create just such a precedent . . . .151
The fact that the panel opted to treat the case as an off-campus
speech case, ignoring the fact that Layshock accessed the site
at school and showed it to his friends, undermines the opinion
and is likely one of the reasons that rehearing was granted and
the opinion was vacated.
B. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,152
J.S., a female eighth grader at Blue Mountain Middle School,
created a fake profile of her principal, James McGonigle, on
MySpace.com using her parents‟ computer. The URL for the
profile
was
http://www.myspace.com/kidsrockmybed.153
Although no school resources were used to create the profile,
J.S. did copy, without permission, a photograph of Mr.
McGonigle from the school‟s website and used it in the fake
profile.154 According to the court‟s description:
[S]he created from her home computer a
MySpace.com Internet profile featuring her
principal, James McGonigle. The profile did not
state McGonigle‟s name, but included his
photograph from the website of Blue Mountain
School District (the “School District”), as well as
profanity-laced statements insinuating that he
was a sex addict and pedophile.155
Gems from this profile noted in the court‟s decision include:
[A] self-portrayal of a middle school principal
named “m-hoe=].” The profile‟s owner described
151. Id. at 260.
152. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated
by No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
153. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 290.
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himself as a married bisexual forty-year-old man
. . . . His “Interests” section read as follows: . . .
“fucking in my office. hitting on students and
their parents.” . . . Another section, entitled
“About me” stated:
“HELLO CHILDREN
yes. it‟s your oh so wonderful, hairy,
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this
world with a small dick
PRINCIPAL
I have come to myspace so i can pervert the
minds of other principal‟s to be just like me.156
J.S. discussed the site with several friends the day after she
created it, and although it was originally a public site available
to everyone, she later made it private, accessible only to those
she allowed.157 Unlike Layshock, there was no evidence that the
site was ever accessed at school.158 However, the website did
create some minor disruption at school.159
J.S. was suspended for ten days and sued the school,
alleging that her suspension for the off-campus website
violated her First Amendment rights.160
The District Court acknowledged that J.S.
created the profile at home, and determined that
it did not substantially and materially disrupt
school so as to satisfy the Tinker standard,
although it did cause some disruption. However,
the District Court ultimately held that, based on

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 291.
See id. at 292.
See id.
See id. at 293-94.
See id. at 294-95.
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the facts of the case and “because the lewd and
vulgar off-campus speech had an effect oncampus,” the School District did not violate J.S.‟s
First Amendment rights by disciplining her.161
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel began its analysis by noting
that the Fraser/Morse framework was inapplicable162
“[b]ecause the Middle School computers block access to
MySpace, students could have viewed the profile only from an
off-campus location.”163 Thus, this case was not an on-campus
speech case. The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel then turned to the
Tinker substantial disruption analysis.164 However, this panel
of the Third Circuit took a far different view of substantial
disruption than the Layshock panel had. As noted earlier, it
appears that the Layshock panel held that Tinker requires a
showing that the profile actually “results in foreseeable and
substantial disruption of school.”165
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel viewed the Tinker showing
differently:
Yet, school authorities need not wait until a
substantial disruption actually occurs in order to
curb the offending speech if they are able to
“demonstrate any facts which might reasonably
have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities.”
...
Our sister courts of appeals offer further support
for the notion that a school may meet its burden
of showing a substantial disruption through its
well-founded belief that future disruption will
occur.166

161. Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
162. See id. at 297-98.
163. Id. at 292.
164. See id. at 298.
165. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249,
263 (3d Cir. 2010).
166. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298-99 (internal citation omitted).
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Within this framework, the J.S. ex rel Snyder panel first
looked to the three items of actual disruption that the school
cited in favor of the discipline (loud classes, administrative
resources used to investigate and discipline, and decorated
lockers supporting the student) and found them wanting.167
“[W]e would have no trouble concluding, as the District Court
did, that these incidents did not amount to a substantial
disruption of the Middle School sufficient to discipline the
students for their speech.”168 However, the J.S. ex rel Snyder
panel did not stop there; it then looked to whether the site had
the potential to cause disruption:
[T]he profile‟s potential to cause a substantial
disruption of the school was reasonably
foreseeable. It is apparent that the underlying
cause for McGonigle‟s concern about the profile
was its particularly disturbing content, not a
petty desire to stifle speech critical of him, and
we proceed with our analysis with this in mind.
Therefore, we are sufficiently persuaded that the
profile presented a reasonable possibility of a
future disruption, which was preempted only by
McGonigle‟s expeditious investigation of the
profile, which secured its quick removal, and his
swift punishment of its creators.169
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel concluded that “based on the
profile‟s nature and its threat of substantial disruption of the
Middle School, that the School District did not offend J.S.‟s
First Amendment free speech rights by punishing her for
creating the profile.”170
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder panel recognized the apparent
tension between its decision and the decision in Layshock
handed down the same day and attempted to distinguish the
cases based on the fact that, in Layshock, the school
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 303.
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purportedly conceded the Tinker disruption test and could not
meet the on-campus requirement of Fraser/Morse.171
Nonetheless, recognizing the inherent tension in J.S. ex rel.
Snyder and Layshock, Third Circuit granted requests for
rehearing en banc in both cases on April 9, 2010.172 Oral
argument took place on June 3, 2010. As of the date of this
article no decision has been rendered by the Third Circuit on
these cases.173
VI. Finding the “Magic Bullet”
Given the extremely unsettled state of the law in this
area, is it any wonder that the school administrators in South
Hadley were at somewhat of a loss with respect to how to deal
with the situation? According to a Boston Globe report quoting
South Hadley Superintendent Gus Sayer: “The kids have a way
of communicating with each other without us knowing about it.
. . . They really have their own world.”174 He went on to say
that “I think the principal did everything he could. . . .
Everyone expects the schools to solve these problems, but we
don‟t have magic-bullet solutions to how kids behave.”175 It is
perhaps no surprise that the Prince family filed a complaint
against the school which was eventually settled.176
When you have two panels of learned jurists releasing
contrary opinions on similar facts on the same day, there is an
obvious need for clarity in this area. While there is no “magicbullet,” as the courts address these issues, there are three
specific areas where clarification would help school
171. Id. at 296-98.
172. See id., reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated by No. 08-4138, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted,
opinion vacated by No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,
2010).
173. Robson, supra note 15.
174. Schworm, supra note 9, at 2 (internal citation omitted).
175. Id. (internal citation omitted).
176. Andrea Canning et al., Phoebe Prince‟s Family Speaks Out as One
Year Anniversary of Suicide Nears, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 23, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/phoebe-princes-family-speaks-settling-lawsuitschool/story?id=12465543&page=2.
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administrators avoid tragedies like that of Phoebe Prince.
First, school administrators need clarification on what
constitutes on-campus speech under the Fraser/Morse
framework. Second, school administrators need guidance on
the application of the Tinker substantial disruption test and,
more specifically, whether the “reasonably foreseeable”
standard applies. Third, schools need to know if there is an
alternative framework that may be more appropriate to apply
to the sub-set of cyberbullying cases.
A. On-campus Speech Under the Fraser/Morse Framework
As noted earlier, one of the oddities of the Layshock
decision is the panel‟s failure to give due weight to the fact that
“[o]n December 15, Justin used a computer in his Spanish
classroom to access his MySpace profile of Trosch. He also
showed it to other classmates . . . .”177 Given this fact, just as in
Morse, the case should have been a rather routine on-campus
speech case requiring a rather formulaic application of the
Fraser framework. Yet the panel chose not to do so and instead
tried to create an artificial distinction to differentiate between
the act of speaking (i.e. creating the website) and the act of
accessing the website at school and showing it to friends.178 The
panel opinion apparently refers to the second as not being an
act of speech, noting that the District could not punish Justin
just because his speech reached inside the school.179
The artificial distinction in Layshock with respect to oncampus speech runs counter to Morse. In Morse the decision
turned on the location of the speech. The Supreme Court held
that the student unfurled his banner on-campus” at a school
event.180 Having reached that conclusion, the Supreme Court
determined that Fraser applied and the school could restrict
speech inconsistent with its educational mission.181 The
Supreme Court did not look to where the student created his

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007).
See generally id.
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banner (almost certainly off of school grounds). Instead the
Supreme Court focused on where he unfurled it, in that case
“on campus.”182 Having found that the banner was unfurled at
school (an act of speech), under Morse that is the end of the oncampus inquiry—the speech took place at school, Fraser
applies, and a school may regulate speech inconsistent with its
education mission regardless of disruption.183
Given the manner in which the Supreme Court handled
the speech in Morse, the Layshock panel decision is incorrect.
Under Morse the issue of where the speech was created is
irrelevant. Instead, the key focus is on whether any of the
speech took place or was accessed at school. Thus, in Layshock,
the analysis should have been relatively simple. Layshock
admitted that he accessed the website at school and showed it
to classmates.184 He metaphorically unfurled his banner at
school by accessing the website and showing it to friends in
exactly the same fashion as the student unfurled his banner in
Morse. As a consequence, as in Morse, once there is evidence
that the website was accessed at school: “The question thus
becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when
that speech is reasonably viewed as [undermining the school‟s
basic educational mission]. We hold that she may.”185
Thus, Layshock notwithstanding, it would seem clear that
if school administrators have evidence that the harassing
materials (texts, Facebook postings of other websites) have
been accessed at school, the Fraser/Morse framework applies
and the school has broad discretion to punish students for that
speech regardless of the Tinker disruption standard. This is
consistent with J.S. ex rel. Snyder, which notes that in the age
of the worldwide web, “J.S.‟s argument for a strict application
of Tinker, limited to the physical boundaries of school
campuses, is unavailing.”186 Thus, as applied to the Phoebe
182. Id. at 397.
183. See generally id.
184. Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253.
185. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (parenthetical text inserted from Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
186. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301
(3d Cir. 2010).
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Prince case, once the South Hadley administrators had
evidence that the speech was accessed at school, the
administrators should have had the full panoply of disciplinary
tools available to punish the cyberbullies regardless of where
the speech was originally created.
B. The “Reasonably Foreseeable” and “Substantial Disruption”
Standards Under Tinker
The second area of concern for school administrators that
crops up in cyberbullying cases, where there is no evidence that
the speech occurs on-campus and the Tinker framework
applies, involves the application of the substantial disruption
standard. The Layshock opinion appears to stand for the
proposition that school administrators cannot regulate
cyberspeech unless they can show actual disruption. The J.S.
ex rel. Snyder opinion rejects this proposition, noting that “[o]ur
sister courts of appeals offer further support for the notion that
a school may meet its burden of showing a substantial
disruption through its well-founded belief that future
disruption will occur.”187
The J.S. ex rel. Snyder opinion certainly seems to have the
better of the argument, with most cases recognizing that the
substantial disruption standard is not limited to actual
disruption, but instead applies where a school can show “a
well-founded expectation of disruption.”188 Thus, under this
characterization of the Tinker framework, South Hadley
administrators could have disciplined the cyberbullies for their
speech if they could “demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities . . . .”189
This framework is helpful with incidents like Internet
bomb threats and related activities, but how well does it apply
to the Phoebe Prince situation where there is no dispute that
the cyberspeech caused actual substantial disruption to her but
187. Id. at 299.
188. Id. at 298 (internal citation omitted).
189. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
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not to anyone else or to the school in general. This is an issue
where guidance is sorely needed. While the reasonably
foreseeable substantial disruption standard works well in some
cases, it is not clear that disruption of one student‟s education
is sufficient to meet this standard.
As noted earlier, according to District Attorney Scheibel,
“[t]he investigation revealed relentless activity directed toward
Phoebe, designed to humiliate her and to make it impossible for
her to remain at school . . . . The bullying, for her, became
intolerable.”190 This cyberharassment did not cause a
substantial disruption to the school as a whole, but it utterly
disrupted Phoebe Prince‟s educational environment. Is this
enough?
C. “Invasion of the Rights of Others” as a Basis for Regulation
A close examination of Tinker does reveal one potential
method for addressing the Phoebe Prince situation where the
cyberspeech is directed at a single student and thus disrupts
her educational environment but nothing else:
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason—whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is,
of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.191
The Confederate Flag cases also seem to provide some
support for the “invasion of the rights of others”192 prong of
Tinker although they have all been ultimately resolved on the
substantial disruption prong. Thus for example, in Barr v.
Lafon,193 while the Sixth Circuit held that the school could ban
a depiction of the Confederate Flag based on the potential for
190.
191.
192.
193.
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Goldman, supra note 1 (internal citation omitted).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
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538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).

36

218

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

disruption due to racial conflict, the court also noted: “Unlike in
Tinker, Plaintiffs-Appellants‟ free-speech rights „colli[de] with
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.‟”194
There is a significant downside to expanding the use of the
“invasion of the rights of others” prong of Tinker to non-tort
speech. Mediating the collision between one set of students‟
free speech rights and a second set of students‟ right to be left
alone is frequently a tough line to navigate and can lead to a
“heckler‟s veto.” For example, in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian
Prairie School District No. 204,195 a student was restricted from
wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay” based
on the fact that it might offend certain LGBT students.196 In a
fascinating opinion exploring the boundaries of the substantial
disruption standard and the fighting words doctrine, the
Seventh Circuit ultimately held that “„Be Happy, Not Gay‟ is
only tepidly negative; „derogatory‟ or „demeaning‟ seems too
strong a characterization” and thus the school could not justify
banning the t-shirt based on a “tendency to provoke such
[homophobic] incidents, or for that matter to poison the
educational atmosphere.”197 Therefore the court held that the
student was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that
the school would violate his First Amendment rights by
preventing him from wearing his t-shirt.198
The only case to address this issue directly is an older
Eighth Circuit case, Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High
School Independent School District No. 14,199 where the court,
citing Tinker, noted that “[t]he First Amendment rights of
students do not extend to expression that „involves . . . invasion
of the rights of others,‟ and . . . we read this phrase as including
only „that speech [which] could result in tort liability.‟”200 In
Harper v. Poway Unified School District,201 Judge Kozinski, in
194. Id. at 568 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). See also Defoe ex rel.
Defoe v. Spiva, 650 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
195. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
196. Id. at 676.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987).
200. Id. at 752 (internal citation omitted).
201. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).

37

2011]

FACEBOOK FATALITIES

219

a dissenting opinion, also briefly noted this provision in Tinker:
Tinker does contain an additional ground for
banning student speech, namely where it is an
“invasion of the rights of others.” . . . The
interaction between harassment law and the
First Amendment is a difficult and unsettled one
because much of what harassment law seeks to
prohibit, the First Amendment seems to
protect.202
Even if the “invasion of the rights of others” prong of
Tinker is limited, as Bystrom suggests, to tort-like actions, this
would certainly seem to be fertile ground for school
administrators wishing to utilize a school‟s disciplinary code to
punish the type of harassment directed towards Phoebe Prince.
Moreover, to the extent that the harassment of Phoebe
Prince consisted of threats of violence towards her, it is highly
likely that those threats would not have been protected under
Tinker. As noted earlier, the first step in any First Amendment
analysis is to consider whether the speech itself is protected. 203
Thus, with harassing or threatening cyberspeech, the initial
inquiry is whether the speech itself is even protected. In Watts
v. United States,204 the Supreme Court recognized that threats
of violence are generally not protected by the First
Amendment.205 In Watts, the Court noted that there may be
some political or social value associated with threatening words
in some circumstances;206 however, the Court has also noted
that the government has an overriding interest in “protecting
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that
fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened
violence will occur . . . .”207 The issue then becomes

202.
203.
(1969).
204.
205.
206.
207.
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distinguishing “[w]hat is a threat . . . from what is
constitutionally protected speech.”208
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Watts declined to set
out a test for determining what constitutes a “true threat” and
the courts of appeals that have announced such a test fall into
two camps. Courts agree on an objective test that focuses on
whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported
threat as a serious expression of intent to cause a present or
future harm. However, their views diverge in determining from
whose viewpoint the statement should be interpreted.209 Some
ask whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the
speaker would foresee that the recipient would perceive the
statement as a threat,210 whereas others ask how a reasonable
person standing in the recipient‟s shoes would view the alleged
threat.211 If a communication is deemed to be a “true threat,”
then under Tinker the student may be punished without regard
to First Amendment concerns.212
One of the first cases to address the true threat analysis in
conjunction with a First Amendment challenge in the school
context was the Ninth Circuit case of Lovell ex rel. Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District.213 In that case, a student
threatened her guidance counselor, stating that she would
shoot the counselor if her schedule was not changed.214 The
student was suspended for threatening her counselor and
challenged the suspension as violative of her First Amendment
rights.215 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the
hallmark of a true threat is whether the victim had reason to
believe that the maker of the threat would follow through with
it.216 In reviewing the context of the speech, the Ninth Circuit
208. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
209. Compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), with United States
v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968 (1994).
210. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1080.
211. Malik, 16 F.3d at 49.
212. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. 2002).
213. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
214. Id. at 368.
215. See id. at 369-70.
216. See id. at 372.
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held that the counselor did indeed have reason to believe the
student might follow through, and therefore it was a true
threat and not protected by the First Amendment.217
The Eighth Circuit case of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski
County Special School District218 provides an interesting
backdrop for this discussion. In that case, “[f]rustrated by [a]
breakup and upset that K.G. would not go out with him again,
J.M. drafted two violent, misogynic, and obscenity-laden rants
expressing a desire to molest, rape, and murder K.G.”219
According to the student, the letters were not intended to be
given to his former girlfriend but instead were intended to be
put to music as part of a rap song.220 The student told his exgirlfriend about the letter, and she arranged to have a mutual
friend obtain a copy.221 The mutual friend took the letter
without permission and gave it to the ex-girlfriend at school.222
The ex-girlfriend read the letter with friends during gym class
and one of them took it to the school resource officer who then
advised administrators.223 After investigating the situation the
school expelled the author for one year under a school policy
that read: “Students shall not, with the purpose of terrorizing
another person, threaten to cause death or serious physical
injury or substantial property damage to another person . . .
.”224
The student challenged the expulsion, arguing that the
letters were protected by the First Amendment.225 The school
responded that they were not protected because they
constituted a “true threat.”226 The Eighth Circuit first looked to
the intent to communicate prong and the student‟s argument
that his letters were not a threat because he never intended to

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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communicate them to his ex-girlfriend.227 The Eighth Circuit
rejected this argument, noting as follows:
In determining whether a statement amounts to
an unprotected threat, there is no requirement
that the speaker intended to carry out the threat,
nor is there any requirement that the speaker
was capable of carrying out the purported threat
of violence. However, the speaker must have
intentionally or knowingly communicated the
statement in question to someone before he or
she may be punished or disciplined for it. The
requirement is satisfied if the speaker
communicates the statement to the object of the
purported threat or to a third party.228
In that case, the Eighth Circuit determined that, because the
author allowed the mutual friend to see the letter knowing he
would likely tell the ex-girlfriend and indeed actually told her
about the letter himself, this conduct was sufficient to meet the
intent to communicate prong of the true threat analysis.229
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the “reasonable
recipient” analysis, which looks to whether the “recipient would
have perceived the letter as a threat.”230
There is no question that the contents of the
letter itself expressed an intent to harm K.G.,
and we disagree entirely, but respectfully, with
the district court‟s assessment that the words
contained in it were only “arguably” threatening.
The letter exhibited J.M.‟s pronounced,
contemptuous and depraved hate for K.G. J.M.
referred to or described K.G. as a “bitch,” “slut,”
“ass,” and a “whore” over 80 times in only four
pages. He used the f-word no fewer than ninety
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id. at 624.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625.
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times and spoke frequently in the letter of his
wish to sodomize, rape, and kill K.G. The most
disturbing aspect of the letter, however, is J.M.‟s
warning in two passages, expressed in
unconditional terms, that K.G. should not go to
sleep because he would be lying under her bed
waiting to kill her with a knife. Most, if not all,
normal thirteen-year-old girls (and probably
most reasonable adults) would be frightened by
the message and tone of J.M.‟s letter and would
fear for their physical well-being if they received
the same letter.231
The ex-girlfriend also testified that she was terrified and
resorted to sleeping with the light on.232 She also left school
early when he was reinstated because she feared meeting him
there.233 As a consequence, the Eighth Circuit found that a
reasonable recipient would have viewed the letters as a
threat.234 “As such, the letter amounted to a true threat, and
the school‟s administrators and the school board did not violate
J.M.‟s First Amendment rights by initiating disciplinary action
based on the letter‟s threatening content.”235
Because the Eighth Circuit resolved the case on a “true
threat” basis, finding that the speech was not protected under
the first prong of Tinker, it did not reach the disruption
element.236 However, it should be noted that there was strong
231. Id.
232. Id. at 626.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 626-27. A similar result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in
LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., where a student wrote a poem
which described in graphic terms his killing of twenty-eight (28) fellow
students and his intent to either commit suicide or go on to kill more
students. 257 F.3d 981, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001). The student turned the poem
in to his English teacher to get her thoughts on the poem. Id. at 984. The
teacher turned the poem in to the vice principal and the student was
eventually expelled for the poem. Id. at 984-86. The student challenged the
expulsion. See id. at 986. The court noted that given the spate of recent school
shootings “we cannot fault the school‟s response.” Id. at 990.
236. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
616, 622-24 (8th Cir. 2002).
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disagreement as to whether these letters were a “true
threat.”237 As noted above, the district court did not believe that
they were, nor did the initial Eighth Circuit panel hearing the
case.238 Moreover, four members of the Eighth Circuit dissented
from the en banc decision, arguing that the letters were not a
true threat because the student never intended to communicate
the threat directly to the ex-girlfriend.239 Because they found
that the speech was protected under the first prong of Tinker,
the dissenters in Doe then turned to the second prong. While
citing the disruption standard, they chose instead to simply
focus on what it felt was a disproportionate punishment: “The
board‟s draconian punishment is unprecedented among the
school threat cases across the nation.”240
Because the dissenters focused on the magnitude of the
punishment and not the ability to punish under the First
Amendment it is difficult to tell if they found that the school
had the power to restrict J.M.‟s speech under the second prong
of Tinker, 241 the “invasion of the rights of others” provision.
In Doe, even if the majority had found that the letters did
not constitute a “true threat,” there is no doubt that these
letters precluded the ex-girlfriend from receiving the benefits of
a public education free from sexual harassment, a right
guaranteed by Title IX.242 Thus J.M.‟s letters, even though they
were protected speech under the first prong of Tinker, are still
subject to restriction under the second prong of Tinker because
they represent an invasion of the rights of others, and
specifically ex-girlfriend‟s right to attend school free of peer
sexual harassment. Indeed, had the school not acted to resolve
the situation, the school itself would be liable for that same
peer sexual harassment under Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.243
Utilizing
this
framework
may
provide
school
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
(1969).
242.
243.
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See id. at 619.
See generally id. at 627-36.
Id. at 635 (Heany, J., dissenting).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
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administrators with the “magic bullet” for responding to
cyberharassment cases such as Phoebe Prince even where the
speech is arguably protected under the first prong of Tinker.244
Of course, in order to show an “invasion of the rights of others,”
the school would have to show that the individual conduct
arises to the level of actionable peer harassment under Davis.
The standard in Davis is sufficiently high that this alone would
likely prevent abuse by schools while at the same time
permitting discipline where warranted and in order to protect
the student that is the target of the harassment.245
This focus on the invasion of the rights of other students
does not limit discipline to cases of sexual or racial harassment

244. The need for such a framework is clear. See Jones v. State, 64
S.W.3d 728 (Ark. 2002) (Arkansas Supreme Court found that a rap song from
one student to another that described the killing of the recipient and her
family constituted a true threat). See also In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712 (Wis.
2001). A 13 year old student told other students at a local youth center that
he “was going to kill everyone at the middle school” and provided graphic
details of how he was going to “make people suffer” and rape a classmate. Id.
at 715. He challenged his conviction for disorderly conduct arguing that his
speech was not a true threat, but was instead mere “trash talking” protected
by the First Amendment. Id. at 716. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
this argument finding that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable speaker in the position of A.S. would foresee that reasonable
listeners would interpret his statements as serious expressions of an intent to
intimidate or inflict bodily harm.” Id. at 720. But see In re C.C.H., 651
N.W.2d 702 (S.D. 2002). South Dakota Supreme Court found that a student‟s
statement to a teacher that “he wanted to kill [B.C.]” was not a true threat.
Id. at 704, 708. However, this case relied heavily on the original Doe v.
Pulaski decision which was later reversed. Id. at 706-07. See In re Douglas
D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001) (Wisconsin Supreme Court finding that story
about a teacher‟s head being cutoff was not a true threat).
245. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (noting that the “provision that the
discrimination occur „under any education program or activity‟ suggests that
the behavior be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the
victim equal access to an educational program or activity. Although, in
theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment
could be said to have such an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress would
have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the
inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be
invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of
one-on-one peer harassment. By limiting private damages actions to cases
having a systemic effect on educational programs or activities, we reconcile
the general principle that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known
peer sexual harassment with the practical realities of responding to student
behavior, realities that Congress could not have meant to be ignored.”).
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but can also extend to other protected categories such as
disability or sexual orientation. For example, the Supreme
Court, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,246 noted
that the Title VII prohibition of discrimination “because of sex”
protects men from sexual harassment by other men. Moreover,
several courts have held that taunts of “queer” create an
actionable hostile work environment and presumably would be
viewed in the same way at school.247
Taking this approach and applying it to the type of
cyberbullying that was directed towards Phoebe Prince seems a
logical fit. For example, it is alleged that the bullies used
Facebook to post messages that called Phoebe Prince a “slut,”
as well as other messages that were so severe and pervasive
that they made it impossible for her to attend school.248
Presumably, if South Hadley were aware of these postings, it
could have disciplined the students under the foregoing
framework for invading her rights and impairing her ability to
receive an education. Even if the students were to argue, as the
student did in Doe, that these comments were not “directed” at
Prince because they were just general Facebook postings, Doe
stands for the proposition that the school administrators may
treat them as directed to Phoebe Prince and discipline them for
the postings nevertheless. The burden of course would be to
demonstrate that the comments were sufficiently severe and
pervasive to impair the students‟ right to a public education
under Davis. If such a showing can be made, then it is likely
that the speech may be restricted under the Tinker “invasion of
the right of others” language.
VII.

Conclusion

As the Phoebe Prince suicide demonstrates, the impact of
cyberharassment on individual students can be both profound
246. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
247. See, e.g., Whelan v. Albertson's, Inc., 879 P.2d 888, 891 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) (repeated taunts of “queer” and “Serge” in front of customers and
co-workers).
248. Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/04/phoebe-prince-should-bullying-be-acrime.html.
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and deadly. Unfortunately, the tools available to school
administrators to deal with such speech are not yet fully
formed. It is difficult to expect school administrators such as
those in South Hadley to quickly and effectively respond to this
type of harassment when their legal ability to do so rests in
such murky waters. When two panels of the Third Circuit, on
essentially the same facts, come to exactly opposite conclusions
as to the ability of schools to discipline for this type of speech,
how can we expect non-lawyer school administrators to
navigate these waters?
It is clearly incumbent on the courts, particularly the en
banc Third Circuit and eventually the Supreme Court, to
cleanse these waters and give school administrators both the
tools and guidance as to how to apply those tools to situations
like the Phoebe Prince case. This is particularly so in the areas
of the definition of “on campus” speech, the gravity and nature
of the Tinker substantial disruption standard, and the
application of the Tinker “invasion of the rights of others”
prong. Until these waters are cleansed, the potential for
tragedies such as the Phoebe Prince suicide remain.
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